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ABSTRACT
The study examines the effects of governance quality and religiosity on tax
evasion (TE) in the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development) countries. Further, the study investigates which government
qualities and religiosities affect TE significantly. Ordinary least squares has
been used to analyze the data gathered from 36 OECD countries covering
the period of 2002–2015 based on the latest data of TE. The results show the
negative impact of governance quality and religiosity on TE; it implies the
higher level of governance quality and religiosity, and the lower level of TE
across the countries. Among the governance qualities, the higher the gov-
ernment effectiveness (GE), the rule of law (RL), and regulatory quality
(RQ), the lower the level of TE as they have a negatively significant impact
on TE. On the contrary, the positive impact of the voice of accountability
(VA) and political stability (PS) on TE implies that with increasing the VA
and PS, TE also increases. Moreover, during the investigation of religiosities
on TE, the study found that Catholics (CATH) have a significant and
negative effect on TE, while Muslim (MUSL) is found to be positively
significant. Overall findings of the study suggest the government of the
OECD countries to emphasize enhancing the governance quality and prac-
ticing of peoples’ religious activities freely, which demotivates people to
evade tax.
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INTRODUCTION
Tax evasion (TE) is a widespread phenomenon, and it has been seen as the most
controversial issue over the last few decades. It is considered a severe loss of
government revenue, resulting in pressure on the government in providing public
services smoothly (Islam, Rashid, Hossain, & Hashmi, 2020). In result, it also
increases the tax burden not only on the government but also on compliant
taxpayers and thereby demotivates them to comply with tax obligation properly.
Therefore, it has been a challenging issue for governments and tax authorities to
increase the taxpayers’ tax revenue. TE occurs if taxpayers do not comply with
their tax obligations intentionally, either through the failure of filing returns,
misreporting income or overstating expenses, or evading tax despite having the
ability to pay the tax (Rashid, 2020).
TE has been considered a subject of discussion for academic research in
developed and developing countries (Nurunnabi, 2018; Richardson, 2016; Umar,
Derashid, Ibrahim, & Bidin, 2019; Yamen, Allam, Bani-Mustafa, & Uyar, 2018).
Policymakers have not had any specific solution to overcome these challenges. It
is almost impossible to efficiently and effectively mitigate the side effects of
government policy without a proper understanding of TE and its relationship to
tax policy and state governance (Prinz & Hokamp, 2015). In developed countries
like the United States, 17% of total income tax is unpaid each year, whereas, in
Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and Japan, it was 8.6% in 2013 (Ahmed,
2016). Similarly, in European countries, the second-largest economy globally
with a gross domestic product (GDP) of €16.5 trillion in 2016 (International
Monetary Fund, 2017), $1.3 trillion is lost due to TE (Ahmed, 2016). Moreover,
after the financial crisis of 2008, the unity of the European Union (EU) has been
vulnerable, especially with the impact of economic recession on Greece, Italy,
and Spain. Moreover, investigating the perception of the tax burden among the
high- and low-income groups of people in Japan, Yamamura (2014) found that
high-income earners pay more tax than low-income earners.
Most of the researchers have focused principally on the economic variables
(Alm, Martinez-Vazquez, & McClellan, 2016; Torgler & Schneider, 2007), while
some researchers have highlighted noneconomic variables in TE studies (Riahi-
Belkaoui, 2004). Moreover, Alm and Torgler (2006) noted that numerous factors
are causes of TE beyond economic factors. Many researchers have attempted to
investigate the determinants of TE. Conducting a 45 cross-country investigation,
Richardson (2006) showed the noneconomic factors also play a crucial role in
determining the impact of TE and have a more substantial effect in comparison
to the economic factors.
The rationale for examining the TE in Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) countries is related to the recent eco-
nomic situations, strength, and dissimilarities in terms of currency. Moreover,
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the OECD countries are typically democratic, which supports free-market
economics. The goal of this organization is to shape policies that foster pros-
perity, equality, opportunity, and well-being for all. Therefore, it is expected
that the governance qualities of the OECD members are higher and thereby
reduce TE. For example, Yamen et al. (2018) exhibited institutional qualities on
TE in European countries and found that institutional factors are negatively
significant with TE. Moreover, Umar et al. (2019) adopted a conceptual
approach to explain the relationship between public governance quality and tax
compliance in developing countries. Similarly, a high degree of religiosity has a
beneficial effect on a human being (Nazaruddin, Rezki, & Rahmanda, 2018).
Religion is a powerful tool for influencing people’s lives and answering ques-
tions about different aspects of their lives. It does not permit TE because it
teaches fairness, and the right people pay the state their tax. Torgler (2006)
found that religious faith substantially impacts the taxpayers’ tax morale
behavior; it ultimately shapes the taxpayers’ compliance behavior. Nurunnabi
(2018) and Islam et al. (2020) found religiosity as the most crucial factor that
negatively influences TE. There is limited research on the effect of governance
quality and religiosity on TE in OECD countries. Therefore, this study raises the
following research questions: Whether the governance quality and religiosity
impact TE in OECD countries? If yes, which governance qualities and religi-
osities significantly affect TE?
In addition to addressing the research questions, the study will contribute to
the existing literature in several ways. First, the research offers a helpful insight
into the causes of TE in OECD countries, which are predominantly noneco-
nomic variables. Second, the study will also check the robustness of the findings,
comparing the results in the context of higher and lower income member states
of OECD. Third, the outcome of this research will guide the government and
policymakers to understand the interrelationship among governance qualities,
religiosity, and TE, which helps to take necessary steps to develop policy
frameworks for reducing TE. Finally, the study provides a key summary of
multiple data sources for future international tax researchers and practitioners.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section “Theory and
Hypothesis Development” discusses theories and develops the hypotheses
considering the relationship between governance qualities, religiosity, and TE.
Section “Methodology” describes the research methods and design with the
empirical specification laid out. Section “Findings and Discussions” analyses the
results and sets out the discussion of the study, and finally, section “Conclusions”
offers the conclusions and implications, along with the limitations of the research
and suggestions for future research.
THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Among many other theories, researchers who have worked on the noneconomic
factors of TE have explored socioeconomic theory, psychological contract
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theory, and contingency theory (Nurunnabi, 2018; Pickhardt & Prinz, 2014). The
socioeconomic theory deals with the sociocultural forces which have an impact
on TE.
Several factors of socioinstitutional norms have been identified in prior
research, which has effects on TE (Nurunnabi, 2018). Governance qualities
(Umar et al., 2019; Yamen et al., 2018) and religiosity (Islam et al., 2020;
Nurunnabi, 2018) may affect the tax behavior of society in particular.
Nurunnabi (2018) identified three major players – the state, the tax authority,
and taxpayers – in the tax social network within which they interact among
themselves, which in turn affects TE. As per the psychological contract theory,
the contract is viewed as a crucial element of the relationship between taxpayers
and government, where taxpayers contribute to the government revenue for the
services provided by the government (Pickhardt & Prinz, 2014). Feld and Frey
(2007) developed the concept of a psychological tax contract between government
and taxpayers to establish a fair and reciprocal obligation through governance
qualities, where one party gives and another take something – a quid pro quo
situation. Based on this theory, taxpayers feel discouraged from paying tax if they
perceive low governance quality in general. Likewise, the moral sentiment theory
infers religiosity as an act that shapes people’s behavior toward internal moral
force in tax payment (Smith & Smith, 2014). Islam et al. (2020) found that people
with religious faith have more moral sense and keep people away from all evil
deeds and deter TE. Furthermore, Richardson and Sawyer (2001) suggested
that contingency factors depend on the nature of the study. For instance,
Riahi-Belkaoui (2004) found that it is necessary for the contingency theory of
tax compliance that calls on not only economic determinants of tax compliance
but also governance and moral determinants. Therefore, based on the socio-
economic, psychological contract, moral sentiment, and contingency theories,
this study considers governance qualities and religiosity as noneconomic factors
that may affect TE.
Governance Qualities
Torgler and Schneider (2009) analyzed the effect of tax morale and governance
quality on the shadow economy from 57 developed and developing countries.
They demonstrated that when the tax morale and governance qualities increase,
the shadow economy decreases. Similarly, Yamen et al. (2018) investigated the
effect of institutional quality on TE with a comparison between old (pre-2004)
and new (post-2004) European member states. They found that institutional
quality is higher in old EU countries than in new EU countries. The higher
institutional quality leads a country’s economy to experience lower TE as
governance quality negatively affects TE (Dreher, Kotsogiannis, & McCorriston,
2009). Nurunnabi (2018) and Islam et al. (2020) also found a negative relation-
ship between governance quality and TE in Asian countries. Moreover, in terms
of what happens between governments and people, Umar et al. (2019) studied the
connection between governance qualities and tax compliance in developing
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nations, leading the people to pay or abstain from paying tax. Based on the
previous research (Islam et al., 2020; Umar et al., 2019; Yamen et al., 2018), the
present study posits a negative relationship between six government indicators
and TE.
Voice and Accountability
Voice and accountability (VA) refer to the perception of capturing the extent to
which a country’s people can select their government. It also measures freedom of
expression about the government, organizational freedom, and freedom of the
press. Furthermore, Walker, Gardner, Herr, and Ostrom (2000) also believe that
this is also essential to improve the effectiveness of collaboration and operation,
involvement, and voting. The study of Umar et al. (2019) also proposed a positive
relationship between VA and tax compliance. Therefore, this debate contributes
to the following hypotheses of Yamen et al. (2018), who hypothesized that there
is a negative association between VA and TE.
Political Stability
Investigating the relationship between democracy and crime, Cuesta (2013)
reviewed several theories. For instance, civilization theory predicts lower crime
rates as democratic systems become more established, i.e., have higher political
stability (PS) (LaFree & Tseloni, 2006). Political instability faced by taxpayers
can be classified into two types: not knowing which political party will be in
control and not knowing whether they would be caught for evading taxes by a
new government (Katz & Owen, 2013). Evidence from prior research suggests a
positive link between tax morale and established democratic traditions (Alm &
Torgler, 2006). Riahi-Belkaoui (2004) found that a good “… deterrent to tax
evasion is the creation of tax morale.” This theory suggests that PS leads to
higher tax morale and lower TE (Umar et al., 2019). Similarly, the study of
Yamen et al. (2018) anticipated that if PS increases, then TE is expected to
decrease.
Government Effectiveness
Government effectiveness (GE) refers to the efficiency of formulating government
policy and how much the government is responsible for the implementation of
such policies. According to Allingham and Sandmo’s (1972) theoretical model,
concealment of income depends on the taxpayer’s evaluation of the expected
utility of the income. It also depends on the efficient allocation of resources by the
government. Torgler and Schneider (2009) advocated that “… better institutions
provide stronger incentives to behave legally and increase the costs of illegal
activities as a consequence of greater institutional accountability.” Yamen et al.
(2018) found a positive relationship between GE and TE, while Umar et al.
(2019) proposed a negative relation between the two.
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Regulatory Quality
Regulatory quality (RQ) measures the perception of the ability of the government
to encourage private sector development through formulating and implementing
sound policies and regulations. To establish and maintain a good relationship
with taxpayers, governments should establish transparent and fair regulations
that foster a healthy environment for the private sector to thrive. Hofmann,
Gangl, Kirchler, and Stark (2013) argued that creating such an environment
through high RQ should reduce the hostile and antagonistic interactions towards
the government that can lead to higher tax compliance levels. Also, high RQ
encourages higher tax morale. Yamen et al. (2018) found that RQ and TE were
negatively related.
Rule of Law
The rule of law (RL) measures the perception of the government’s ability to
enforce the laws for society and, in particular, how well these laws tackle crimes
and violence with the quality of the contract, property rights, the police, and the
courts. Wahl, Kastlunger, and Kirchler (2010) argued that the level of TE is
subject to several factors, including trust in authority and the deterrence power
of the tax authority. Kirchler, Hoelzl, and Wahl (2008) differentiated between
two types of societies, namely those with antagonistic climates and with syn-
ergistic climates. When individuals perceive the government as legitimate, they
are persuaded to accept a service and client culture. Kirchler et al. (2008)
advocated that tax compliance can be achieved through an increase within a
society to be committed to following its rules. Previous researchers proposed a
negative relationship between RL and TE (Yamen et al. (2018).
Control of Corruption
Control of corruption (CC) measures the perception of a government’s ability to
prevent the exercise of power for private gain and prevent small- and large-scale
corruption. Friedman, Johnson, Kaufmann, and Zoido-Lobaton (2000) advo-
cated that “… greater corruption and a weaker legal environment are all asso-
ciated with a larger informal economy.” Besides, Alon and Hageman’s (2013)
study of 5,000 firms operating in 22 former Soviet countries found evidence of
lower tax compliance under a high level of corruption. It can be argued that
corruption can incentivize individuals and businesses to evade paying taxes as
well as to facilitate it through public officials. It is proposed that with increasing
the level of CC, the level of TE will decline.
Religiosity
Religiosity is defined as a devotion to religion and the loyalty of an individual.
A high level of religiosity will positively impact everyday life (Nazaruddin et al.,
2018). The results of previous studies indicate that religiosity has a positive
impact on individual compliance in paying taxes (Benk, Budak, Yüzbaşı, &
Mohdali, 2016; Torgler, 2006). However, several studies show that religiosity
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does not affect tax compliance (McKerchar, Bloomquist, & Pope, 2013).
Richardson (2008) found a negative relationship between religiosity and TE.
Major religions condemn a fellow man’s manipulation relatively evenly. These
religions’ antimanipulative ethos tends to form a strong social norm against all
types of nation-wide manipulative conduct (Callen, Morel, & Richardson,
2011).
In addition, risk aversion offers another potential connection between religion
and TE, indicating that religious people are more risk-averse than the general
population (Hilary & Hui, 2009). Risk-averse people are less likely to be involved
in TE (Callen et al., 2011). A negative relationship between religiosity and TE has
been found in the previous literature (Nurunnabi, 2018). According to Hirschi
and Stark (1969), religion might inhibit illegal behavior because religion is a
sanctioning system that legitimizes and reinforces social value. Stack and
Kposowa (2006) examined the impact of religiosity on the acceptability of tax
fraud in 36 nations and discovered that the acceptability of religiosity and tax fraud
has a negative relationship.
Muslim (MUSL)/Islam
According to Islam, “God will punish us if we do not pay to the state” (Jalili,
2012). In Islam, Zakah (tax and paying tax) is the third pillar of Islam and is
mandatory. As per the Quranic verse,
…indeed, those who believe and do righteous deeds and establish prayer and give Zakah will
have their reward with their Lord, and there will be no fear concerning them, nor will they
grieve. (Surat Al-Baqarah, 2:277)
Moreover, in Islam, Surah 4 verse 29 states that: “Believers do not devour
one another’s possessions wrongfully; rather than that, let there be trading by
mutual consent.” The commentators on the Quran indicate that the expression
“wrongfully” embraces all transactions which are opposed to righteousness and
which are either legally or morally reprehensible, and “mutual consent” means
that the exchange should be free of undue pressure, fraud, and deception
(Callen et al., 2011). Bartke and Schwarze (2008) found the Muslims as more
risk-averse than Protestants and the latter are more risk-averse than Catholics.
Catholics have a higher tendency to evade tax. Conducting a study in 38
Muslim majority countries worldwide, Nurunnabi (2018) found a significant
and negative relationship between Muslims and TE.
Catholics (CATH)
In Christianity, the New Testament states that: “Therefore each one of you
must hold off falsehood and talk to his neighbor in truth, for we are all
members of one body” (Ephesians 4:24–26). The literature also found a sig-
nificant negative relationship between TE and Christian religiosity across
countries. Tittle (1980) commented that “religiosity discourages deviant forms
of behavior and is therefore crucial in shaping social norms.” Grasmick,
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Bursik, and Cochran (1991) found that both church attendance and individual
religiosity have a negative relationship with TE. Though Richardson (2016) did
not find any association between Catholics and TE, Torgler (2006) found a
strong correlation between religiosity and tax morale. He also mentioned that
strong effects could be observed for those who had a religious education and
those actively involved in a church or a religious organization. Prior researchers
have argued that there is less risk-averseness among CATH than MUSL and
PROT (Bartke & Schwarze, 2008; Callen et al., 2011).
Protestants (PROT)
According to Furnham (1983), one reason might be that people with stronger
protestant ethics are naturally against certain aspects of taxation, believing that
success is based “purely upon effort and that the poor and unemployed are to
blame for their plight.” He also found that a higher degree of protestant work
ethic leads to more opposition to taxation. Torgler (2006) found that Orthodox
and Protestants tend to have lower tax morale than the Catholics, Hindus, and
Buddhists, while Richardson (2016) found no significant relationship between




The study uses the shadow economy as a proxy for TE and considers a sample of
504 from 36 OECD countries, covering the period of 2002–2015. The primary
consideration for the inclusion of individual countries in the study is the avail-
ability of TE data. However, due to data unavailability, the five countries – Chile,
Israel, Mexico, South Korea, and Iceland in the OECD – are excluded from the
study, while the other five countries – Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Malta, and
Romania – have been included.
Dependent Variable
In this study, the dependent variable is TE as a proxy of the shadow economy
(Yamen et al., 2018). It is measured as a percentage of GDP for the 14 years
2002–2015. Most previous studies estimated the size of the shadow economy at
the macro levels (Schneider & Buehn, 2012). As there is no perfect measure of
TE, this research also considers the macroeconomic measure of shadow economy
based on the MIMIC model (multiple causes multiple indicators) (Islam et al.,
2020).1 International Monetary Fund (IMF) defines the shadow economy as:
By nature, the shadow economy is challenging to quantify, as agents involved in the shadow
economy activities attempt to remain hidden. The scale of the shadow economy’s growth over
time is driven by its political and economic importance. In addition, overall economic activities
involving official and unofficial production of goods and services are needed to establish
economic policies that respond to changes.
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Independent Variables
The independent variables used in this study are government quality calculated as
an average score of all six World Government Indicators (WGIs) and the per-
centage of people having religious faith in line with the prior studies (Islam et al.,
2020; Nurunnabi, 2018). Further, we considered six WGIs and three major
religions of the OECD countries to determine which government qualities and
religions affect TE. They are as follows:
• Governance qualities indicating six WGIs, namely voice accountability (VA),
PS, GE, RQ, RL, and CC; and
• Three religion, namely Catholics (CATH), Muslims (MUSL), and Protestants
(PROT).
The data sources for the independent variables are WGIs for governance
qualities and individual country’s websites for religion. These are set out in
Appendix 2.
Control Variables
For panel research with the cross-country, it is essential to include a few variables
to regulate the country’s social and economic differences. The control factors that
are included in the model to adjust social and economic distinctions are unem-
ployment rates (UNEM) as a proportion of the total population, and agriculture
(AGR) as a proportion of GDP, level of income (Income), and Happy Planate
Index (HPI) (Yamen et al., 2018). The higher the rate of unemployment, the
higher the level of TE expected. On the other hand, the higher the level of income
and the higher the score of HPI, the lower the level of TE. As a source of income,
the higher a country’s farming is, the lower its TE. Both the data of UNEM and
AGR have been gathered from the World Bank database (World Bank, 2018),
while the data of HPI were collected from the NationMaster. Finally, all the
OECD countries were classified into two board groups based on income level:
higher and lower. The states with lower-level income include low income and
lower-middle income, whereas the countries with higher levels include upper-
middle and high income classified by the World Bank.
Estimation
The following OLS (ordinary least squares) regression model is projected to
examine the prospective connection between good governance indicator, culture,
religion, unemployment, agriculture, and the shadow economy, across the
European and non-European nations.
TEi ¼ a0 1b1VAi 1b2PSi 1b3GEi 1b4RQi 1b5RLi 1b6CoCi 1
b7CATHi 1b8MUSLi 1b9PROTi 1b10UNEMi 1b11AGRi 1
b12INCOMEi 1b13HPIi 1 «i
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where, TEi 5 tax evasion as a proxy of shadow economy; VAi 5 voice and
accountability; PSi 5 political stability; GEi 5 government efficiency; RQi 5
regulatory quality; RLi 5 the rule of law; CCi 5 control of corruption; CATHi
5 the percentage of Catholic; MUSLi 5 the percentage of Muslim; PROTi 5 the
percentage of protestant; UNEMi 5 the percentage of unemployment; AGRi 5
the percentage of agriculture; INCOMEi 5 a dummy variable has been used to
indicate the income where 1 is for low- and lower-middle-income countries and 2
for upper-middle and high-income countries classified by the World Bank; HPI5
score of Happy Planet Index; and «i 5 error term for country i; i 5 number of
countries.
Method
As the study uses noneconomic variables, data are static (Islam et al., 2020). As a
standard constant technique, we have used the pooled OLS method. It is often
known to estimate data under the chief assumption that there is no heterogeneity
between cross-sectional units; more precisely, all cross-sectional units are
considered a single unit in this process. Thus, the pooled OLS approach assumes
no differences between the cross-country or individuals or businesses within the
cross-sectional data. This approach estimates a single constant “a” for all cross-
country operations.
Pooled OLS model:
Y it ¼ a1b1x1it 1b2x2it 1b3x3it 1b4x4it 1 uit (1)
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS
Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 summarizes the descriptive statistics for the variables used in this 36-
country research with a sample of 504 observations. This table demonstrates that
TE is widespread among the OECD countries as the standard deviation of TE is
high (SD 5 7.85) while the mean is 18.72%. This outcome occurs as the summary
suggests that the range of government qualities significantly varies from a
negative score to a positive score. The standard deviation of the governance
indicators is also scattered among the OECD nations. Similarly, the religiosity
among the people highly varies as the percentage of standard deviation is more
than the average percentage of all the religions.
Correlations
Furthermore, the findings of the Pearson pairwise correlation are shown in
Table 2, which shows that there are many important correlations between TE
and the independent variables. For instance, all six governance indicators have
a significant and negative correlation with TE at a 1% level. TE and VA (r 5
20.71), TE and PS (r520.46), TE and GE (r520.79), TE and RQ (r520.74),
Q5
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TE and RL (r 5 20.81), and TE and CC (r 5 20.78). Thus, these results imply
that the higher the governance qualities, the lower the level of TE.
Furthermore, this study found no correlation between CATH and TE, while
MUSL and PROT are positively and negatively correlated with TE. The results
indicate that with an increase in the number of Muslims in the OECD coun-
tries, the level of TE increases. In contrast, an increase in the number of
Protestants reduces the level of TE. Besides, there is a positive correlation
between UNEM and TE (r 5 0.44) and AGR and TE (r 5 0.57) at a 1% level
of significance. The results mean that the higher the level of the unemployment
rate and agriculture, the higher the level of TE. On the contrary, HPI and
INCOME are found to be a negative and significant correlation with TE. These
results imply that the level of TE goes down with increasing the level of
happiness and income. These findings provide some preliminary support to the
hypotheses of the study. However, the results expose that some of the gover-
nance qualities are highly correlated with each other. It technically seems that
there is a multicollinearity problem among the variables.2 It was further
addressed by considering the VIF values in the stepwise regression analysis (see
Table 3 and Appendix 3).
Regression Analysis
Table 3 shows the regression results of governance quality and religiosity on TE
in the OECD countries, along with lower-income and higher-income countries
separately. The leading cause behind this separation is to determine the
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics.
Variables Obs. Min Max Mean Stand. Dev.
TE 504 5.9 36.1 18.72 7.85
GQ 504 20.27 1.97 1.14 0.53
REL 504 16.00 86.00 46.08 20.73
VA 504 20.37 1.8 1.15 0.39
PS 504 21.49 1.76 0.79 0.50
GE 504 20.36 2.35 1.24 0.62
RQ 504 20.04 1.97 1.25 0.44
RL 504 20.26 2.1 1.22 0.63
CC 504 20.52 2.47 1.18 0.82
CATH 504 0.05 93 37.34 32.60
MUSL 504 0.02 98.6 6.25 16.30
PROT 504 0.08 86.2 15.68 24.09
UNEM 504 2.49 27.47 8.40 4.38
AGR 504 0.23 12.5 2.59 2.00
HPI 504 26.4 51.6 42.93 6.23
INCOME 504 0 1 0.75 0.43
Source: Author’s own calculation.
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robustness of whether there is a significant difference in TE between the groups.
The findings of all models demonstrate that both governance quality and reli-
gious faith have a significant and negative effect on TE. The results imply that
the higher the governance quality among the nations and the religious faith
among the people of the OECD member countries, the lower the level of TE.
More specifically, an increase in governance quality and religious faith signifi-
cantly reduces TE. Table 3 also shows that UNEM has a positive and significant
effect on TE. These findings indicate that the higher the unemployment rate, the
greater the level of TE in OECD countries. In contrast, INCOME and HPI
shows a negative and significant impact on TE. The results indicate that the
increase in the level of income and happiness reduces TE to a significant extent.
However, there is no significant difference between the high-level and low-level
income countries except the significant and positive effect of AGR on TE in
high-level income countries. It means that, as a source of income, farmers of
higher-income OECD countries would like to pay tax as little as possible as the
lower-income countries.
Table 2. Pearson Pairwise Correlations.
TE VA PS GE RQ RL CC
TE 1
VA 20.71** 1
PS 20.46** 0.74** 1
GE 20.79** 0.87** 0.61** 1
RQ 20.74** 0.88** 0.62** 0.88** 1
RL 20.81** 0.91** 0.64** 0.95** 0.92** 1
CC 20.78** 0.88** 0.59** 0.95** 0.89** 0.95** 1
CATH 0.06 0.03 0.17** 20.13** 20.14** 20.11* 20.18**
MUSL 0.25** 20.53** 20.60** 20.24** 20.36** 20.30** 20.23**
PROT 20.32** 0.39** 0.21** 0.48** 0.46** 0.46** 0.48**
UNEM 0.44** 20.45** 20.41** 20.47** 20.52** 20.52** 20.52**
AGR 0.57** 20.66** 20.47** 20.61** 20.57** 20.64** 20.54**
HPI 20.10* 0.06 0.08 0.14** 20.01 0.10* 0.15**
INCOME 20.71** 0.68** 0.39** 0.61** 0.56** 0.62** 0.61**
CATH MUSL PROT UNEM AGR HPI INCOME
CATH 1
MUSL 20.24** 1
PROT 20.43** 20.12** 1
UNEM 0.24** 0.04 20.23** 1
AGR 20.23** 0.44** 20.27** 0.26** 1
HPI 0.01 0.18** 20.03 20.11** 0.07 1
INCOME 0.01 20.34** 0.21** 20.23** 20.55** 20.08 1
Note: *p , 0.10, **p , 0.05, ***p , 0.01.
Source: Author’s own calculation.
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Impact of Governance Qualities on Tax Evasion
As Table 3 shows that the average score of governance quality reduces TE in all the
models supporting the findings of Nurunnabi (2018) and Islam et al. (2020), Table 4
specifies which governance qualities (indicators) have a significant effect on TE.
Moreover, two separate models for higher-income and lower-income countries,
along with a full model (all OECD countries), have been drawn to analyze the data.
Of six WGIs, the effect of GE (22.65, p , 0.05), RQ (24.31, p , 0.01), and
RL (27.85, p , 0.01) on TE are found to be negative and significant in the full
model in the line of the previous studies (Hofmann et al., 2013; Yamen et al.,
2018). These results indicate that the higher the level of governance effective-
ness, RQ, and the RL, the lower the level of TE. If the governments establish
transparency, laws, justices, and fair regulations for citizens, people are
encouraged to pay taxes voluntarily, which results in a reduction in TE. The
legitimacy of the government (including the lack of corruption and bribery), the
fairness of the tax scheme (rates and enforcement), and adequate tax revenue
allocation are the most basic contributing factors to reducing TE behavior. On
the other hand, the study found a negatively insignificant effect of CC on TE,
Table 3. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Regression Results Based on the
Average Score of Religiosity and Governance Quality.3
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N 504 378 126
F 77.71 23.781 15.495
r2 0.753 0.544 0.679
r2_a 0.743 0.521 0.635
Note: t statistics in parentheses. * p , 0.10, **p , 0.05, ***p , 0.01.
Source: Author’s own calculation.
3To examine the fixed effect of religiosity and governance quality on tax evasion (TE), we use a
year dummy in a separate model with an average score of World Bank’s six dimensions of World
Government Indicator (WGI). Similarly, we consider religiosity, which is measured as a
percentage of the importance of religions in practical life. These data adopted from a survey
conducted by Gallup Poll in 2009 in which they asked for “yes” and “no” questions, “Is religion
important in your daily life?” In this model, a dummy year also includes controlling the time
effect on TE.
Q7
Impact of Governance Quality and Religiosity on Tax Evasion 101
though Yamen et al. (2018) found a significant and negative relationship
between CC and TE. Hence, TE does not depend on the CC, as it is not an
essential factor in OECD countries.
Interestingly, however, as the study found a significant and positive relation-
ship between VA and TE (13.96, p , 0.01) in all models, it is consistent with a
prior study of Yamen et al. (2018). Similarly, the study showed a positive effect of
PS (1.13, p , 0.1) on TE despite having a negative correlation between VA and
TE, and PS and TE are represented in Table 2. The result happens because they
may have a suppression effect of multiple regressions that results in a decline in
the levels of TE.4 This issue was investigated further (presented in Appendix 3)
whether the coefficient and correlation bear a similar relation.
Table 4. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Regression Results (All Countries).
(1) 2 3 4 5













































































































N 504 472 378 126
F 134.9688 114.2266 46.4227 23.4889
r2 0.7817 0.7643 0.6042 0.7138
r2_a 0.7759 0.7576 0.5911 0.6834
Note: Standard errors in parentheses and *p , 0.10, **p , 0.05, ***p , 0.01.
Source: Author’s own calculation.
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Impact of Religiosity on Tax Evasion
The empirical findings regarding the religious practices on TE have provided
mixed results. The outcomes of the effects of each of the three major religions –
Catholicism (CATH), Protestantism (PROT), and Islam/Muslim (MUSL) – of the
sample countries on TE are also presented in Table 4. In the full model, among the
three religions, CATH (20.02, p , 0.01) relates negatively to TE, whereas MUSL
(0.07, p, 0.01) relates positively to TE. Interestingly, PROT does not affect TE. The
negative and significant impact of Catholics on TE is inconsistent with the previous
studies of Richardson (2006) and Callen et al. (2011). However, the results imply
that the higher the level of the Catholics, the lower the level of TE in the OECD
countries. The results also show that the Protestant has an insignificant effect on TE.
On the other hand, the positive and significant impact of Muslims on TE is
not consistent with the study of Nurunnabi (2018) and Islam et al. (2020). This
finding contradicts with the results of the prior studies (Bartke & Schwarze,
2008; Callen et al., 2011), and as they believe that “accountability is first of all
to Allah” (Forster & Fenwick, 2015) and “God will punish us if we do not pay
to the state” (Jalili, 2012). Therefore, a question of why MUSL has been found
positive with TE may arise. The answer to this question could be either any or
all of: (1) Muslims think in a solely Islamic state that the leaders are repre-
sentatives of God on earth with God’s permission, which justifies and empha-
sizes the duty to obey them. However, such a state does not presently exist, and
even if it does, it is unlikely that it would be run sincerely by the individuals in
charge of running the state, as humans are imperfect (Jalili, 2012); (2) In most of
the OECD countries, Muslims are not increasing to such an extent as the levels of
TE are decreasing as per the data trend over the last 15 years; (3) Another cause
of this positive effect of Muslims on TE may be due to the suppressive impact of
governance qualities as column 4 and column 5 of Appendix 3 shows the negative
impact of Muslims on TE. These two models were run considering VA and PS
separately. Similarly, the Protestants show the negative effect as per column 5. These
findings indicate that with increasing the number of Muslims and Protestants, the
level of TE declines, whereas Catholics increases, so do the level of TE. These
findings of the study provide an insight that Catholics are less risk-averse than
Muslims and Protestants in OECD nations and have a high tendency to evade
tax, which supports the evidence of previous research (Bartke & Schwarze, 2008).
Furthermore, the control variables, HPI, income level, show a negative effect
on TE while the unemployment rate shows a positive effect. These results are
consistent with Table 3 and prove the robustness of the findings.
Additional Tests
Further, the study uses (Human Development Index) HDI instead of HPI in
column 3 of Table 4 in line with the study of Yamen et al. (2018) for robustness
check. The additional tests documented similar results of the baseline model,
which show a negative relationship between the governance qualities and TE,
except that the insignificant relationship of MUSL and PS with TE. This result
indicates that the Muslims are not supposed to evade tax when they receive three
basic dimensions of HDI – healthy life, education, and a decent standard of
living. Moreover, the insignificant impact of PS on TE implies that if the three
basic dimensions of human development are ensured, PS will not affect TE.
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Above all, the findings indicate that a higher level of governance quality is
reflected in a lower level of TE in OECD countries, which supports the study of
Yamen et al. (2018).
Furthermore, the study also compared the finding between higher- and lower-
income countries shown in columns 4 and 5 of the similar Table 4. The results
presented a significant and negative effect of GE (24.38, p , 0.01), RQ (25.09,
p , 0.01) and RL (211.66, p , 0.01) on TE, while a positive effect of VA (12.05,
p , 0.01), PS (1.37, p , 0.1), and CC (3.36, p , 0.01) are found to be significant
in higher-income countries. These results explain that GE, RL, and fairness in the
tax system may reduce TE in higher-income countries. These findings support the
study of Pavlik and Young (2020) as they found that the higher the level of
income and lower the level of TE due to greater GE.
On the contrary to the higher-income countries, the lower-income countries
demonstrated that RL (26.38, p , 0.01) and CC (25.62, p , 0.01) have a
negative impact on TE, while VA (10.23, p , 0.01) and RQ (4.13, p , 0.05)
have a positive impact. Therefore, in lower-income countries, not only the rules
and regulations are to be ensured but also corruption must be controlled with a
strong hand to reduce the level of TE to a great extent. Additionally, the
average TE in lower-income countries is higher than that of higher-income
countries as the intercept of lower-income countries is not significant. The
finding is also consistent with the study of Yamamura (2014), as he found
higher-income people pay more tax than lower-income people. Accordingly,
these findings provide evidence of differences in governance qualities between
two groups of OECD countries, contributing to the observed differences in the
level of TE.
Further, during the investigation of the religious effect on TE among the
higher-level and lower-level income countries, the study found that CATH
significantly and negatively relates to TE in the higher-income model while
insignificantly relates in the lower-income model. In both the groups of coun-
tries, the Protestants have no effect of evading tax while the Muslims play a
significant and positive role in evading tax. To sum, all these additional tests
are almost similar to the baseline model; it proves the robustness of our
findings.
CONCLUSIONS
This study investigates the impact of governance qualities and religiosity on TE.
The results of this study have many implications for researchers, policymakers,
and the governments as each government would like to reduce the level of TE in
their country. The overall results of the study suggest that the governments of
the OECD countries should improve the voice of accountability, PS, and
enhance government efficiency and CC more as they are not playing an influ-
ential role in reducing TE. Their governments also need to focus more on
improving freedom of speech and stabilize a strong commitment among the
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political parties to reduce TE. Moreover, RL and required quality should be
strengthened to combat corruption at all levels instead of employing enforce-
ment efforts. Ultimately, the public must regard the taxing authority as
persuasive, the tax system as fair, and government expenditure as helpful and
competent to significantly enhance the scenario. The governments, policy-
makers, and the officials of the respected countries should focus more on
improving the governance indicators to control TE.
Moreover, finding mixed results regarding religions provides some insights.
The overall findings imply that if the extent of religious practices among the
people increases, this shapes their social norms, which discourage all deviant
forms of human behavior, which reduces the level of TE. More specifically, the
government of the OECD countries should emphasize more the practicing of
peoples’ religious activities freely, which in turn demotivates people to evade tax.
Moreover, the specific insights should allow governments and policymakers to
gain a better understanding of the critical variables that are significantly associ-
ated with TE internationally. By designing and implementing sound strategies,
the governments and tax authorities should be able to improve their tax collection
capacity by reducing TE.
This study is subject to several limitations. First, the research was con-
ducted in OECD countries, most of which are from the developed world. The
findings may not be generalized to other parts of the world. Therefore, future
researches may consider more countries from different regions. Second, due to
space constraint, it was not possible to undertake extensive research like to
include additional variables (i.e., demographic characteristics: age, gender,
occupation, level of income and education/tax knowledge; environmental
macro variables, inflation, and GDP; legal enforcement, doing business, etc.)
which is a potential area for future research. Finally, we use the shadow
economy as a proxy of TE. However, as there is no perfect TE measure,
Alm (2012) remarked, “each approach for estimating tax evasion has its
limitation.”
NOTES
1. This multiple causes multiple indicators (MIMIC) model takes into account various
factors such as tax burden, regulatory burden, economic freedom index, business freedom
index, unemployment rate, and gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (Schneider,
Buehn, & Montenegro, 2010), which directly affects the dimensions of the shadow econ-
omy over time.
2. Though many of the researchers consider a correlation of above 0.9 as a multi-
collinearity problem (Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson, & Tatham, 1998), the study of Yamen
et al. (2018) did not consider it as a problem despite having a couple of correlations of more
than 0.9 as they addressed the issue by considering the VIF values. In line with their
studies, we have monitored VIF values in regression analysis.
3. To examine the fixed effect of religiosity and governance quality on tax evasion (TE),
we use a year dummy in a separate model with an average score of World Bank’s six
dimensions of World Government Indicator (WGI). Similarly, we consider religiosity,
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which is measured as a percentage of the importance of religions in practical life. These
data adopted from a survey conducted by Gallup Poll in 2009 in which they asked for
“yes” and “no” questions, “Is religion important in your daily life?” In this model, a
dummy year also includes controlling the time effect on TE.
4. A simple linear regression was conducted to justify the base model, which showed that
there is a significant and negative relationship between voice of accountability (VA) and
TE (25.49, p , 0.01) and political stability (PS) and TE (21.8, p , 0.01). The result is due
to the effect of religiosities and income on TE since no relationship was found when
religiosities were dropped from the model represented in Appendix 3. Another cause
behind the result may be that the people of Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) countries feel free to express their opinions compared to that of
other countries. As a result, taxpayers may try to conceal their income in their income tax
returns and raise their voice against a very high tax rate, which in turn results in a high
tendency of taxpayers to be involved in TE.
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APPENDIX 1: LIST OF OECD COUNTRIES
European OECD Countries Non-European OECD
Countries
Austria Denmark Slovenia Latvia Portugal Turkey
Belgium Estonia Spain Lithuania Romania Australia
Bulgaria Finland Sweden Luxembourg Slovak
Republic
Canada
Croatia France Hungary Malta United
Kingdom
Japan
Cyprus Germany Ireland Netherlands Norway New Zealand
Czech
Republic
Greece Italy Poland Switzerland United States
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Tax evasion has been adopted as the
proxy of shadow economy, which is
defined as the “Market-based production
of goods and services, whether legal or
illegal, that escapes detection in the
official estimates as a percentage of GDP
for the year 2002–2015.”







The governance qualities have been used
from the World Bank’s six dimensions of
Worldwide Governance Indicators
(WGI) for the year 2002–2015, on a scale
from 22.5 to 2.5, with higher values
corresponding to better governance.





The percentages of Catholics (CATH),
Muslims (MUSL), and Protestants
(PROT), in 2002–2015.
Further, the study used religiosity as a
percentage of the importance of religions
in practical life. Gallup Poll conducted
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Gallup_Polla survey in 2009 in which
they asked for “yes” and “no” question,
“Is religion important in your daily life?”
Individual country’s website and the






Unemployment as a percentage of the





The value-added of agriculture as a




Income The World Bank classifies the countries
into four groups based on income, e.g.,
low, lower-middle, upper-middle, and
high income using the Atlas method. The
study uses a dummy variable for
measuring income where 1 is for 1st two







The Happy Planet Index combines four
elements such as well-being, life
expectancy, inequality of outcomes, and
ecological footprint to show how
efficiently residents of different countries
are using environmental resources to lead
long and happy lives.
https://www.nationmaster.com/country-
info/stats/Culture/Happy-Planet-Index
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APPENDIX 3: OLS RESULT REPRESENTING THE IMPACT
OF VA ON TE
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N 504 504 504
F 138.9595 123.4806 116.1104
r2 0.7565 0.6662 0.6524
r2_a 0.7511 0.6608 0.6467
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * p , 0.10, **p , 0.05, ***p , 0.01.
Source: Author’s own calculation.
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